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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the persistence of high unemployment has been one of the most 
relevant economic problems in most OECD countries, and especially worrying in 
Spain1. The investigation of the phenomenon of unemployment persistence and of what 
circumstances may influence it is an important step toward developing economic 
policies. In that context, the analysis of the future labour market position of job losers 
and if they may remain in unemployment for a long period of time may provide 
additional insights on the knowledge of the cost of unemployment. 
The notion that unemployed individuals may be permanently trapped in 
joblessness is explored theoretically in Blanchard and Diamond (1994), Ljungqvist and 
Sargent (1998) and Ridder and van den Berg (2001). Most studies in the literature 
regarding the effect of a job loss on displaced workers focus their attention on the issue 
of earning losses associated with spells of job interruption: Farber (1997), Jacobson et 
al. (1993) and Stevens (1997) for the US and Arulampalam (2001) and Gregory and 
Jukes (2001) for the UK. Evidence for other European economies is much more sparse 
(Ackum, 1991, for Sweden; Burda and Mertens, 2001, for Germany; García-Pérez and 
Rebollo, 2006, and Arranz and García-Serrano, 2004, for Spain). 
Other studies analyze the effect of unemployment incidence and/or duration on 
future unemployment spells: Arulampalam et al. (2000) and Gregg (2001), for the UK; 
Muhleisen and Zimmermann (1994) for Germany; Roed et al. (1999) for Norway; 
Arranz and Muro (2004) for Spain; and Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Omori (1997) 
for the US. Finally, research on the labour market position of job losers and whether or 
not they face problems in leaving unemployment is already extensive in North America 
(Ruhm, 1991, and Jacobson et al., 1993) but limited in the European literature (Bender 
et al., 2002, for France and Germany; Addison and Portugal, 2003, for Portugal; 
                                                          
1 In 1991, the Spanish unemployment rate was 16.3 percent, increasing during the sharp crisis of the 
early-1990s up to 24.2 percent in 1994. Since then, it has shown a continuing decreasing trend. 
Nowadays, the unemployment rate is below 9 percent, still high when compared with the US (4.8 
percent), Japan (4.1 percent) and the average OECD countries (6.3 percent), although close to the average 
Euro zone (8.2 percent) (see OECD, 2006). This rate is not strictly comparable to that of 1991, due to the 
change in the definition of unemployment introduced in 2001, in application of a new EC Regulation. The 
comparable figure would probably be 2-3 points higher (for more details, see Garrido and Toharia, 2004). 
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Lubyova and Van Ours, 1999, for Slovakia; and Cebrián et al., 1996, Bover et al., 2002, 
and Alba-Ramírez et al., 2006, for Spain)2. 
The analysis of the future labour market position of the unemployed in a 
competing risks framework with two destination states (employment and inactivity), 
while not yet commonplace in the duration literature, is becoming more familiar 
(Meyer, 1990; Narendranathan and Stewart, 1993; Addison and Portugal, 2003). This 
will be the main objective of this paper. For that purpose, we will consider an 
unemployment duration model in which hazard rates from unemployment may result 
into the risks of entering a job or becoming inactive3. In our analysis, we will 
distinguish between workers with previous labour experience (job losers) and without it 
(first-job seekers), allowing for observed and unobserved characteristics to affect the 
unemployment exit process. Furthermore, the investigation will also focus on the 
possible disincentive effects of benefits on exits out of unemployment and the 
transitions from unemployment to either temporary or permanent job contracts. 
The data come from the quarterly Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA, Encuesta 
de Población Activa) linked files. We select those individuals who have just started an 
unemployment spell (“new entrants”) in each quarter of every year over the period 1992 
(first quarter)-2004 (fourth quarter). These individuals are followed during the period 
they remain in the survey (up to six quarters), so that the duration of their 
unemployment spells ranges from one month to a maximum of 18 months. Obviously, 
some workers remain unemployed for the whole observation window but other 
experience transitions into either employment or out of labour force4. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the data, how the 
sample has been extracted and the way the information on the unemployment spells has 
                                                          
2 There are also studies that investigate the influence of individual's previous unemployment experience 
on future job duration; see, for instance, Booth et al. (1999) and Böheim and Taylor (2002) in the UK and 
García-Pérez (1997) and Arranz and García-Serrano (2004) in Spain. 
3 Flinn and Heckman (1983) addressed the question of whether unemployment and out of labour force are 
distinct states. 
4 In the Spanish literature, there is a previous work by Alba (1999) which analyzes individual transitions 
from unemployment to either employment or inactivity. Our paper presents some relevant differences 
with it. First, we use the period 1992- 2004 in our analysis while he used the period 1987-1995. Second, 
we analyze transitions out of unemployment obtained by worker's labour market status in all six 
consecutive quarters, while he used only two consecutive quarters. Third, we use time varying covariates, 
and observed and unobserved heterogeneity in a competing risk duration model, while he used a 
multinomial logit without time varying covariates and without unobserved heterogeneity terms in the 
estimations. Finally, we consider all men and women who become unemployed at the time of the 
quarterly survey, aged between 16-64 years old, with and without previous labour experience, while he 
analyzed only men, aged 20-59, with previous work experience. 
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been constructed. Section 3 outlines the methodology employed in the empirical 
analysis: the discrete time competing risks hazard rate model. Section 4 provides the 
estimation results. Finally, section 5 summarizes the main findings and offers some 
conclusions. 
2. The data 
The data we use in this paper is taken from the Spanish Labour Force Survey 
(EPA). This a nationally representative survey developed quarterly by the National 
Statistical Office (INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadística). The period under analysis is 
1992(1)-2004(4), the starting and ending dates being dictated by changes in survey 
design after the first quarter of 1992 and 2005, respectively. In each quarter, the EPA 
sample consists of approximately 60,000 households, or 200,000 individuals. One sixth 
of them leave the sample each quarter. This allows following transitions out of 
unemployment for up to six subsequent quarters. Hence, the individual is observed over 
a time interval of up to six quarters of length. 
Since our attention focuses on the unemployed, we select those individuals who 
enter the unemployment state in each quarter. The longitudinal nature of the survey 
makes it possible to check their labour market status in subsequent quarters, allowing 
for three exclusive states: unemployment (U), employment (E) and out of the labour 
force (OLF). Therefore, we are able to know whether an unemployed individual has 
experienced no transition from unemployment or he/she has moved from U to E or from 
U to OLF between two subsequent quarters. The questionnaire in each quarter provides 
us with individual demographic information (such as gender, marital status, age, level of 
schooling), information on previous job match (the reason for job loss, job occupation, 
institutional sector, firm’s industry affiliation) and other variables (tenure on current 
unemployment spell and whether the individual receive unemployment benefits). 
Data files have been linked thanks to the existence of individual identification 
numbers. The data on unemployment history is brought into person-month format and 
then the variables necessary for the implementation of the estimations are constructed, 
in particular the spell identifiers, the censoring indicators and the hazard rates. The 
selection consists of individuals aged 16-64 who become unemployed at the time of the 
quarterly survey (in fact, those who have been unemployed for less than three months at 
the moment of the interview). We assume that unemployment spells that are not 
completed (i.e. the unemployed that have not moved from U either to E or to OLF) from 
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the first quarter up to the sixth quarter are right-censored durations at that length. 13.7 
percent of total spells are censored unemployment spells, 58.6 percent end in a 
transition from U to E and 27.7 percent in a transition from U to OLF. 
After the sample selection, the total inflow consists of 14,861 individuals. Table 
A.1 in the Appendix provide descriptive statistics for the entire sample and for 
individuals with and without previous labour experience. Job losers represent 81.3 
percent of the total inflow into unemployment (65.6 percent lost their last job due to the 
end of a temporary contract, 5.9 percent due to layoffs, and 2.3 and 7.5 percent because 
of involuntary and voluntary reasons, respectively). This information is displayed in 
Figure 1 for the whole time period under analysis. 
The mean unemployment duration is around 7 months for job losers and 8 months 
for those without previous labour experience. We also observe a higher percentage (17.9 
percent) of censored unemployment spells for workers without previous job experience 
than for job losers (12.2 percent). The proportion of individuals who exit from U to 
OLF is higher in the case of those without previous job experience (48.9 percent) than 
in the case of job losers (22.8 percent). On the contrary, the proportion of job losers who 
exit from U to E is higher than that for those without previous job experience: 64.5 
percent against 33.2 percent. The evolution of these proportions may be viewed in 
Figures 2 and 3. 
Figures 4-6 show the proportions of unemployed workers who find a job, who exit 
to out of the labour force and who remain in unemployment by cause of exit from the 
last job. In general, data from these figures suggest that workers without previous 
employment experience are less prone to make transitions from U to E while those 
entering in unemployment due to the ending of a temporary contract are more likely to 
move to the employment state. 
Finally, figures 7-9 contain information on the survival function of exiting from U 
to E and to OLF for the entire sample, for workers with and without previous job 
experience, and by cause of exit from the last job, respectively. The duration of a spell 
of unemployment is defined as the period of time elapsed between the first quarter of 
inflow into unemployment and the last quarter of outflow from unemployment. From 
Figure 7, we see that there are more right censored observations in the exits from U to 
OLF (51.5 percent) than into E (26.7 percent). Therefore, the unemployed remain 
shorter time in unemployment when they exit to E than to OLF. Distinguishing job 
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losers from the unemployed without previous job experience makes it possible to detect 
a different behaviour in the individuals: unemployment spells for job losers before 
exiting to E (to OLF) are the shortest (the longest); on the contrary, the unemployment 
duration for individuals without previous job experience is shorter before exiting to 
OLF than to E. 
Figure 8 shows that individuals without labour experience remain longer in 
unemployment before exiting to a job than the rest of workers, with a 48.2 percent of 
censored observations. Then, we have workers entering unemployment from layoffs 
(with 35 percent of censored observations), due to voluntary reasons (32.4 percent) and 
due to involuntary reasons (29 percent). Finally, those who ended a contract exhibit the 
shortest unemployment duration (20.5 percent of censored durations). 
Finally, in analyzing the transitions from U to OLF, Figure 9 suggests that the 
unemployed without previous job experience remain the shortest in unemployment 
before exiting to OLF (with 37.2 percent of censored observations), followed by those 
who entered unemployment due to voluntary reasons (42.1 percent), due to the end of a 
contract (57 percent), and due to layoffs and involuntary reasons (around 60 percent of 
censored spells). 
3. Econometric specification 
3.1. The econometric model 
The model chosen for the empirical analysis is a discrete time competing risks 
hazard rate model. A discrete time model is chosen because the data is available in 
discrete time intervals (monthly data). A competing risks framework is selected since 
we are able to distinguish between two exit modes out of unemployment for each 
individual: employment and out of labour force. In the formulation of the model, we 
follow the terminology proposed by Allison (1982) and Jenkins (1995), extended by 
Steiner (2001), Lauer (2003), D' Addio and Rosholm (2005) and Alba et al. (2006). 
In our case, the basic idea of the hazard rate model is that one divides the 
unemployment duration into a discrete and finite number of time intervals and looks 
whether the individual has left or not the unemployment state in each time interval. The 
hazard rate is assumed to be constant within time intervals but is allowed to differ 
between them. In this context, the hazard rate ( sijh ) that individual i leaves her sth spell 
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of state j (unemployment) to destination k (employment or out of labour force) in the 
interval It, given that her spell lasted in state j until the beginning of interval It, 
conditional on observed characteristics xijk(t) and unobserved characteristics vij, is as 
follows: 
)),(,|),Pr()),(|( ijkijk
s
ijk
s
ijk
s
ijkijkijk
s
ijk vtxtTdtTvtxth ≥==    (1) 
   i=1,…,N; j,k=1,…,K; t=1,…, sijT ; S=1,…,Si 
 Where sijT  is the time spent by individual i in the sth spell of state j, It is a 
discrete number of intervals and sijd  equals 1 if the sth spell of individual i in state j 
ends in state k, 0 otherwise (spell censored or ends in other state than k). 
Assuming that all spell observations -conditional on the explanatory variables and 
the unobserved factors- are independent and that censoring is random, the sample 
likelihood function for the original state j may be written as follows (see Jenkins, 1995; 
Steiner, 2001; and Lauer, 2003)5: 
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Where sijky  is a binary variable that takes value equal 1 if the sth spell of 
individual i in state j is censored and 0 otherwise. 
In order to estimate empirically the likelihood function, it is necessary to assume 
further specification choices. For the hazard rate we choose the logistic specification 
that, with multiple events, generates the multinomial logit model (Maddala, 1983). It 
allows for the three possible states considered: employment, out of labour force, and 
remaining unemployed (which is the reference state category). For individual i, the 
transition rate from state j to k specified as a multinomial logit can be written as 
(Steiner, 2001; Lauer, 2001): 
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5 We omit temporarily xijk(t) and vij to simplify notation. 
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In (3) xijk is a vector of explanatory variables that may vary with time, βjk is a 
vector of parameters to be estimated; the terms αjk stands for the so-called baseline 
hazard which represents the pattern of duration dependence. The specification of the 
baseline hazard is very important in duration models. A common but restrictive 
approach consists in specifying a parametric form (for instance, gamma, weibull, log-
normal, etc.). Nevertheless, this approach is very strong because the assumptions over 
the form are difficult to justify from an economic point of view and provokes a 
misspecification problem. To avoid that problem, we specify a semi-parametric 
approach: a piecewise constant hazard, by specifying monthly dummy variables for 
which coefficients for transitions from unemployment to employment can differ from 
those for transitions to inactivity. This method presents the advantage of being a flexible 
pattern of duration dependence assuming that this pattern may vary among the states 
where the duration effect is found to be constant or the number of observations is very 
small. 
Finally, vij account for unobserved heterogeneity characteristics in the model such 
as motivation, ability, effort, etc. We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity effect is 
a specific destination state, time constant, and independent of the observed 
characteristics6. Unobserved heterogeneity is discretely distributed with unknown 
support points. These points can be interpreted as latent individual's variables. Heckman 
and Singer (1984) described the non-parametric approach based on the existence of 
some latent classes of individuals. In this approach, one assumes that vij may be divided 
in a limited number of mass points vmj with a given probability π7. Then, the likelihood 
function for an individual may be obtained integrating the following conditional 
likelihood distribution: 
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6 This is a standard assumption in duration models (Jenkins, 1995; Steiner, 2001 D’Addio and Rosholm, 
2005).If we relax the assumption and v is correlated with X, then the probability of exiting from 
unemployment through employment or inactivity will be affected, and a test for endogeneity will be 
required. 
7 The number of mass points will be determined by the approach of Baker and Melino (2000). A 
comparison of information criteria is computed from the estimation results of models with a different 
number of mass points: the number of mass points is increased until the addition of a further mass point 
stops improving the model. 
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In the next section we estimate this likelihood function by maximum likelihood to 
know how personal, job and labour market characteristics influence unemployment 
durations of spells that end either in employment or in inactivity. 
3.2. Specification tests  
The main limitation of the multinomial (or competing risks) specification is the 
property of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) that has to be fulfilled. In a 
setting with three alternatives, the IIA means that the ratio of the probabilities of any 
two alternatives does not depend on the characteristics of a third alternative. The 
validity of the IIA assumptions will be tested by means of two tests: the Hausman (HM) 
test (Hausman and Mc Fadden, 1984) and the Small-Hsiao (SH) test (Small and Hsiao, 
1985). These popular tests consist in partitioning the choice set of alternatives into 
subsets and therefore comparing the coefficients (HM) or the likelihood functions (SH) 
from the complete model and from the restricted model obtained by leaving out one or 
more alternatives. We also have Wald and LR tests to test whether some of the outcome 
categories should be combined (for instance, whether the parameter estimates differ 
significantly across outcome categories). 
Table 1 provides the results of these tests. The HM and SH tests show that the null 
hypothesis is accepted; then, the IIA assumption would be fulfilled. Therefore, these 
tests indicate that the data support the multinomial logit specification for each departure 
state. Wald and LR tests examine whether some states can be pooled into a single state, 
in which case the specification should binomial rather than multinomial. As the results 
show, the null hypothesis that the coefficients of the two candidates for pooling are not 
significantly different is rejected for any pair of potential alternatives. The rejection 
means that unemployment, employment and OLF are distinct states. Then, the 
multinomial specification seems to be appropriate, since none of the categories could be 
combined.  
Finally, in order to see whether the number of mass points found as optimal is 
robust towards the specification with unobservables in the standard multilogit model 
which is implicit in the text, three alternative information criteria are used: Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) and Bayesian info criterion 
(BIC)8. Table 2 reports the value of these information criteria. The preferred model is 
                                                          
8 A description of the AIC, BIC and HQI criterias are presented in Baker and Melino (2000) and Lauer 
(2003).  
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that yielding the lowest IC value. As can be seen, all information criteria lead to the 
same conclusion. For all the unemployed, for job losers and for the unemployed without 
previous labour experience, accounting for individual unobserved heterogeneity by 
distinguishing two mass points does not improve the fit of the models, which means that 
the best model should not include any mass point. 
Alternatively, a simple likelihood ratio test of a model with unobserved 
heterogeneity against another without unobserved heterogeneity confirms the 
conclusion that unobserved heterogeneity is not significant. The value of the likelihood 
ratio test statistic for the entire sample of a model with unobserved heterogeneity 
against that without it is 1.144. This value exceeds the critical chi square value of 5.99 
for 2 d.f. at significance level of 5 percent and, therefore, the unobserved heterogeneity 
component should not be included in the specification of the model. The values of the 
likelihood ratio test statistic are 0.922 and 1.591 for the estimations regarding job losers 
and those unemployed without previous labour experience sample, respectively. Both 
values exceed the critical chi square value (previously mentioned); therefore, 
unobserved heterogeneity is also not significant9. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1. Explanatory variables 
In the estimation, we consider the following set of variables (an extended 
description is presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix): 
- Socio-demographic variables: gender, age dummies, marital status, attained 
educational level and relation with the person of reference in the household. 
- Previous job variables: previous employment experience, type of sector, cause 
of exit from the last job, occupation, industry affiliation, and last job duration. 
- Job search variables: previous position in the labour market before job search 
(working, engaged in education, domestic work, etc.), whether workers 
                                                          
9 We have also estimated a third order polynomial specification for the baseline hazard function with two 
support points for the unobserved heterogeneity (that was significant) rather a piecewise-constant baseline 
hazard function. Although the likelihood ratio tests cannot be used to differentiate betweeen both 
specifications because the models are not nested, we chose a piecewise constant baseline hazard function 
in this paper since the data we use is discrete and it provides a more flexible representation of the baseline 
hazard function. Nevertheless, the results of the third order polynomial for the baseline hazard function 
are very similar to those presented in the text (see Appendix, Tables A3-A5). 
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receive unemployment benefits, type of job he/she is looking for (only full-
time job, preferably full-time, preferably part-time, only part-time, or 
whatever type), and whether the unemployed would accept a job that implied 
to move to a different city, a change in occupation, less income given his/her 
qualifications, or a job category below what was expected. 
- Other variables: the quarterly regional unemployment rate to control for 
labour demand conditions, the quarterly GDP rate to capture the effect of the 
business cycle, and four dummies to control for the quarter of exit and entry to 
examine the existence of a possible seasonal effect and the calendar time 
effect, respectively. Furthermore, a duration dependence pattern through a 
number of monthly dummies used for the baseline hazard specification is 
included for each exit state.  
4.2. Expected effects 
Turning to the effect of particular individual and job related characteristics on the 
exit rate of unemployment, we expect the following effects. If inactivity were a true 
destination state for women when they are in active age, then men would exhibit a 
positive effect on the risk of exiting from unemployment to employment. Elderly 
unemployed workers have skills that are more likely to become obsolete, so they would 
experience more difficulties in adapting to a new job and will show less probability of 
exiting to employment and more probability of exiting to inactivity (Narendranathan 
and Nickell, 1985)10. Single workers are more able to accept a job because they are 
more mobile. On the contrary, married unemployed may search more intensively since 
they have familiar responsibilities and need more income. The effect of the educational 
level is ambiguous. On the one hand, the higher the worker’s educational level, the 
higher his/her reservation wage and, hence, the lower the probability of accepting a job 
offer. On the other hand, employers may prefer those unemployed with higher 
educational level expecting a higher productivity, so the probability of exiting to a job 
may be higher. 
The prediction on the influence of benefits on the exit from unemployment is also 
ambiguous, since there are an incentive and a disincentive effect on the intensity of job 
                                                          
10 Elderly unemployed workers normally accumulate more labour experience which generates a higher reservation 
wage. This provokes that they have less probability of getting a new job (Folmer and van Dijk, 1988). 
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search by the unemployed (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). On the one hand, the 
standard prediction is that the unemployed receiving benefits will exhibit a lower 
probability of transition from unemployment to employment since the incentive of 
unemployed workers to search for a job is reduced. On the other hand, there is an 
incentive effect arising from the fact that the level of benefits increases the resources 
devoted to search and hence increases the probability of finding a job. 
Regarding the influence of previous labour market experience, it may be 
anticipated that those individuals with previous experience may be considered as wage 
earners and, therefore, they would show a higher probability of experiencing transitions 
from unemployment to employment than those without previous labour market 
experience. An additional insight comes from the fact that individuals become 
unemployed due to different reasons. In this sense, we may expect that workers who 
have been laid off face more difficulties to find a job, if job-match specific human 
capital has been lost (Podgursky and Swaim, 1987; Ruhm, 1991). Moreover, tenure on 
the last job may have a scarring effect on the duration of the current unemployment 
spell (Kuhn, 2002). 
We expect GDP growth rate to have a positive effect on the hazard rate of finding 
a job. Concerning the state of local labour market demand, the unemployed who live in 
regions with low regional unemployment rates will enjoy a higher probability of finding 
a job since there would be less competition for existing vacancies. Finally, regarding the 
influence of industry affiliation, we expect that workers in service and building sectors 
will face expanding employment opportunities and higher chances to find a job. 
4.3. Results 
Table 3 reports parallel results from fitting a competing risks hazard model to 
analyze the determinants of exiting from unemployment through two destination states: 
employment (E) and out of the labour force (OLF). The first two columns provide the 
determinants of exits from U through E or through OLF for the entire sample. The 
following two columns offer the results regarding the same specification of the model but 
for the unemployed with previous labour experience, and the last two columns for those 
workers without previous labour experience. 
The reference individual for the estimations without previous experience is a man, 
aged 25-34 years old, non-married, without studies, main person of the household, who 
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declare that he/she does not know if would accept a job in another city, in another 
occupation, of less income and with a lower job category, and looking for a job of 
whatever type regarding working time. Supplement regressors are incorporated in the 
estimations for job losers. The reference here is that last job was in a white-collar high-
skilled occupation, in the private sector, and in industry; in addition, he/she exited from 
the last job by voluntary reasons and does not receive unemployment benefits. 
We first present the results for socio-demographic variables; later, we shall report 
results for previous job characteristics; finally, we will comment results on job search 
variables and will conduct some extensions. 
4.3.1. Socio-demographic variables 
We observe differences in the regression coefficients estimated across destination 
states. With respect to the exit from U to E, gender, marital status and age seem to 
matter for the two groups of unemployed. Female job losers exhibit a significantly 11 
percent lower probability of exiting from U to E than similar men. This negative effect 
is larger (around 20 percent) for those women without previous labour experience. The 
familiar pro-supply effect of marital status is quite confirmed in the case of job losers: 
being married increases the probability of transitions from U to E. Nevertheless, this 
effect is larger for married men. On the contrary, while women without previous labour 
experience show a lower risk of exiting from U to OLF than men (a 22 percent), women 
who are job losers and married are more likely to be less attached to the labour force 
than men. This can be related to family reasons. 
Regarding the effect of age, differences are very marked. While individuals aged 
25-34 have more chances of getting an employment (for job losers and for workers 
without previous job experience as well), the oldest workers tend to be the most 
disadvantaged since they exhibit the lowest transition rates from U to E (these are even 
lower for those without previous labour experience). On the other hand, the age variable 
does not affect significantly the risk of exiting from U to OLF for the unemployed 
without previous labour experience. But for the group of job losers the oldest and the 
youngest are those who show the largest likelihood of exiting from U to OLF. This 
means that younger job losers are more inclined to come back to study or to domestic or 
family care, while older job losers are more inclined to retire. 
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Finally, attainted educational level affects transitions from U to OLF: all workers 
with any educational level different from having no studies (save for post-compulsory 
secondary) are less likely to drop out the labour force. However, the educational level is 
not significant in explaining transitions from U to E since it appears to have no 
influence on the search process. The reason may be that the educational level segments 
the labour market and therefore workers search for a job in their own labour segment. 
Then, the probability that a job is offered does not depend on the educational level, and 
although the reservation wage is higher for the unemployed with more formal 
education, their probability of accepting a job offer is not lower since their wage offers 
are also higher. Gonzalo (2002) has also detected this insignificant effect of educational 
level on transitions from U to E for Spain.  
4.3.2. Previous job experience variables 
There are several job experience variables that provide interesting insights into the 
way workers exit from U either into E or into OLF: whether or not the individual has 
been employed previously, the cause of exit from last job, the type of sector, occupation 
and industry affiliation. 
One of the most interesting findings relates to the first of those variables. In fact, 
having been employed previously increases 37 percent the probability of returning to 
employment in the future after unemployment. This result seems to indicate that 
workers who have been somehow attached to the labour market in the past possess some 
characteristics making them more prone to coming back to employment relative to those 
individuals who have never been employed. On the contrary, previous job experience 
does not play any role in the transitions from U to OLF. 
Comments on the rest of variables are only for job losers. Those workers who 
entered unemployed due to a layoff exhibit a 22 percent lower probability of exiting 
from U to E vis-à-vis the reference category (voluntary reasons as early retirement, 
quitting, etc.), while workers who entered unemployment following the termination of a 
fixed-term contract have noticeably a 11 percent higher probability of moving from one 
job to another with an intermediate unemployment period. Therefore, the latter are more 
employable but at the same time they have more risk of experiencing unemployment. 
Böheim and Taylor (2002) in the UK and by Arranz and García-Serrano (2004) in Spain 
have also found previously this effect. Not surprisingly, those who entered unemployed 
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for voluntary reasons show a larger probability of exiting to OLF than the rest of 
individuals. 
With regards to the industry affiliation, job losers from the agriculture and 
building sector exhibit a higher hazard rate from U to E across the period of study than 
workers from the industry sector. This is an expected result since those are the sectors 
with the highest proportion of temporary employment in the Spanish economy. 
Therefore, worker turnover is high, individuals move from one job to another very 
frequently and job durations are short. We also find that job losers from the agriculture 
and the service sectors show higher probability of dropping the labour force. Finally, 
hazard rates from U to E are larger for workers who previously worked in blue-collar 
jobs and in the public sector. 
4.3.3. Job search variables  
The variable that captures the situation of the unemployed previously to begin the 
process of searching for a job provides some interesting results. Compared to the 
unemployed who were working before they started looking for a job, job losers who 
were in domestic work or were in education are stigmatised because they have less 
probability of entering to a job and have more probability of dropping out of the labour 
force. Again, this result stresses the importance of being attached to the labour market to 
increase the employability of individuals and to avoid definitive exits to inactivity. 
 Second, we have constructed a set of variables as indicators of either pressure to 
accept a job or labour force attachment. These are based on four variables that capture 
the effect of willingness to accept a job in a different city, in a different occupation, 
commanding less wage for the given qualification or in a job category lower than 
expected (possible answers to these variables are ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘don’t know’). The 
first dummy variable takes value 1 if the worker indicates that he would be ready to 
accept a job in all the above-mentioned four dimensions. The second dummy variable 
takes value 1 if he is ready to accept a job in at least one of those options. Finally, the 
third variable (reference category) takes value 1 if he would not accept (or he does not 
know) a job in neither of these options. Results indicate that job losers and workers 
without previous labour experience who report that they would accept a job under either 
all the referred conditions or any of those conditions have around 20-22 percent less 
probability of finding a job. Moreover, they exhibit much less probability of leaving the 
 16
labour force. These are the same results obtained by Alba-Ramírez (1999) using two 
consecutive waves of the Spanish LFS. 
 Another variable trying to capture workers’ choosiness in the job search process is 
that relating to the type of job (working time) they are looking for. In this case, our 
findings suggest that job losers who declare that they are searching only for a full-time 
job exhibit more probability of exiting from U to E. At the same time, job losers and 
those without previous labour experience who are willing to accept only a part-time job 
are more likely to drop out the labour force. 
The receipt of unemployment benefits11 has the standard expected effects on the 
exits from U into E and OLF: non-claimants exit from unemployment faster than 
claimants do. The effect on the exit from U into E agrees with that found previously by 
Alba-Ramírez (1999), Bover et al. (2002) and Gonzalo (2002) with the Spanish LFS 
data. Results also suggest that the benefits’ disincentive effect translates into a lower 
probability of exiting to inactivity: transition rates from U to OLF are two times more 
important than from U to E. This effect was previously documented by Wadsworth 
(1991) for the UK. 
4.3.4. Other variables 
There is a clear indication that the higher the quarterly regional unemployment 
rates the lower the probability of exiting from U to E and the higher the probability of 
leaving the labour force for the two groups analyzed, being both effects lower in 
absolute value for job losers. This result suggests that there is a discouragement effect 
from participation when labour market is slack. Similarly, the business cycle variable 
indicates that the higher the quarterly GDP rate, the higher the probability of finding a 
job for job losers. This means that in expansions the hazard rate from unemployment 
increases because firms create new vacancies and offer better wages. However, these 
opportunities are only available to job losers: the business cycle does not alter the 
transitions from unemployment of workers without previous experience. 
Year dummies variables also allow observing the effect of business cycle on 
transitions from U to E and OLF. Concerning the transition from U to E, the coefficients 
for year dummies are positive but only significant for job losers, increasing from 1995 
                                                          
11 This variable contains information on individuals who receive either unemployment insurance or 
unemployment assistance benefits. 
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to 2003. The probability is especially large in the period 2000-2002. As for the 
probability of leaving the labour force, it increased from 1998 to 2003. This result is 
worrying since it has happened in a period of economic expansion and net employment 
creation. 
Finally, Figure 10 displays the estimated duration dependence for job losers and 
unemployed without previous work experience at mean of covariates. As can be 
observed, estimated hazard rates from U to E are greater than from U to OLF for the 
entire sample. Furthermore, it can be observed how in a competing risks framework the 
U-E and U-OLF estimated hazard rates steadily exhibit positive duration dependence 
during the first months up to the fourth month, negative duration dependence until the 
tenth month, and a positive duration dependence thereafter. Notice that the mobility 
pattern of both collective for each outcome is similar. The estimated hazard rates from 
U to E for job losers keeps over the hazard rate from unemployment to OLF and from U 
to E and OLF for the unemployed without previous work experience. Then, expected 
unemployment duration for job losers who exit to a job is shorter than for the rest of 
outcomes. On the contrary, the unemployed without previous work experience exhibits 
shorter unemployment duration when they exit from U to OLF than job losers for the 
same outcome. 
4.3.5. Further extensions 
• Previous job tenure 
Table 4 reports an extension to the results offered in Table 4. In this new 
estimation, we examine the effect of previous job tenure on transitions out of 
unemployment. The purpose is to try and analyze whether duration in the last job 
influences (positively or negatively) the probability of exiting from unemployment. For 
that, we use the whole set of variables included in the previous estimation except the 
cause of exit from last job and the unemployment benefits variables since there is some 
correlation between previous job tenure and these variables. As it is well known, 
previous job tenure and the reason for leaving last job provide indirect information on 
unemployment benefits: whether the individual has the right to receive benefits and its 
duration. 
The results suggest that the influence of previous job tenure on the probability of 
leaving the labour force is non-existent, but the longer the duration in the previous job, 
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the lower the hazard rate from U into E. This effect might be related to the loss of 
specific human capital when workers are separated from their previous jobs: if firms 
and workers are engaged in long-term relationships, the rupture of a job match makes 
the specific component of human capital to vanish and individuals may find more 
difficult to search for a new job suitable for their skills. In this sense, there is a risk of 
human capital deterioration and qualifications get obsolete with time, which may reduce 
productivity and, as a result, re-employment probabilities. 
• Cause of exit from previous job: end of contract and layoffs 
The distinction across individuals according to the reason of exit from the 
previous job is potentially relevant since it may illuminate the effect of specific human 
capital on re-employment probabilities. In order to investigate this, Table 5 displays the 
results for the estimation of transitions from U to E and OLF for workers who were 
previously employed but were separated from their last job due to either the end of a 
contract or a layoff. 
Regarding those workers who became unemployed due to contract ending, their 
results are similar to those mentioned for the entire sample and for job losers (Table 3), 
save for the benefit and job category variables that do not influence transitions from U 
to E. Hence, the unemployed with less probability of finding a job are women (specially 
married), the elderly workers, workers in the private sector, in industry sector, in 
regions with the highest regional unemployment rate, who became unemployed in a 
recession, who were in domestic work previously to start looking for a job, ready to 
accept a job in another city and/or occupation and/or of less income and/or with lower 
job category, and those with large previous job duration. We also find that the 
coefficients for year dummies are positive, suggesting that the probability of transitions 
from U to E increased from 1994 to at least 2000. 
On the contrary, married women, older and younger job losers, blue collar 
workers, workers in agriculture and service sectors, in regions with high unemployment 
rates, who were in education or in domestic work previously to start searching for a job, 
who do not receive benefits, do not accept a job in another city and/or occupation and/or 
of less income and/or with lower job category, are more likely to be less attached to the 
labour force. The coefficients for year dummies are positive after 1997, but only 
significant from 2000 to 2003. 
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If we focus our attention on transitions of workers who were laid-off from their 
previous job, we find that married women, workers aged more than 35 years old, 
workers from the private sector, white collar high skilled workers, those working in 
regions with the highest regional unemployment rates and with longer previous job 
tenure are more prone to experience lower transitions from U to E. In contrast, married 
women, individuals without studies, who worked in the public sector, with longer 
previous job tenure, who are not ready to accept a job in another city and/or occupation 
and/or of less income and/or with lower job category are the group of workers with 
more probability of leaving the labour force. These transitions have increased steadily 
from 2000 to 2003.  
• Stepping-stones versus dead-end jobs for the unemployed 
Temporary contracts are often regarded as an important component of labour 
market flexibility in Spain in the last twenty years. There is an extensive debate on the 
effects of temporary employment on the economy and on welfare, in general, and on the 
labour history of workers, in particular. On the one hand, some authors (Booth et al., 
2002) argue that the existence of temporary jobs helps to currently unemployed workers 
since they provide them with opportunities to gain work experience and acquire human 
capital and acts as a positive signal (stepping-stones) towards a permanent and more 
desirable jobs. On the other hand, other authors consider temporary jobs as dead-end 
jobs since they are undesirable jobs compared to permanent ones: worse labour 
conditions (lower wages, greater labour security and bad time schedules) and less work-
related training, which implies that workers are more likely to have lower motivation at 
work. Hence, workers trapped in a chain of temporary jobs and unemployment have 
more risk of developing worse labour careers and of exclusion from the labour market. 
In the literature, we may find studies analyzing empirically the effect of temporary 
jobs on workers’ labour careers. There is not a clear conclusion since results differ 
across countries. Thus, works by Hagen (2003) for Germany, Zijl et al. (2004) for the 
Netherlands, Glagiarducci (2005) for Italy and Engelland and Riphahn (2005) for 
Switzerland find that temporary jobs have a positive signal (stepping-stones) towards a 
permanent job. On the contrary, Amuedo (2000) for Spain finds that temporary jobs 
have a negative signal on the probability of getting a permanent job, and Booth et al. 
(2002) for UK, Güell and Petrongolo (2003) for Spain, and D'Addio and Rosholm 
(2005) for the UE find evidence for both theories. In this section, we analyze the extent 
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to which temporary employment makes it easy for unemployed workers to move from 
unemployment either to a permanent work (stepping-stones) or to other temporary job 
(dead-end). 
Table 6 reports determinants of transitions for the entire sample from 
unemployment directly to a permanent job, from unemployment to a temporary job, 
from unemployment to other type of job (self-employment) or to inactivity. We first 
focus our attention on the estimation for the exits from unemployment either to a 
temporary or to a permanent job. Our findings indicate that the unemployed who were 
separated from a previous job match due to the ending of a temporary job and 
experience an intermediate unemployment period show a 22.6 percent higher 
probability of exiting to a temporary job. By contrast, they have an 18 percent less 
probability of finding a temporary job if the prior job match finished due to a layoff. 
These results suggest the presence of a dead-end effect since workers who accepted a 
temporary job in the past are strongly attached to a temporary job in the future. Thus, as 
we mentioned previously, they are trapped in a chain of temporary jobs and 
unemployment with more risk of developing worse labour careers and of exclusion from 
the labour market. Furthermore, we also find that the unemployed whose previous job 
termination was due to the end of a contract (temporary job) exhibit a 30 percent lower 
probability of accessing to a permanent job.  
Given the presence of a dead-end effect, the comparison of the parameters of the 
transitions from unemployment to permanent jobs and from unemployment to 
temporary jobs is informative of the relevance of this effect for obtaining temporary 
jobs12. Older unemployed have less probability of moving from unemployment to 
permanent or temporary jobs. Males have higher probability of finding temporary jobs. 
Being married (and being female) has a strong negative effect on the transitions from 
unemployment to temporary jobs. Having worked in the public sector increases the 
probability of exiting to temporary jobs and reduces the probability of accessing to 
permanent jobs. This evidence suggests the existence of a temporary job-
unemployment-temporary job channel in the public sector that reflects its increasing use 
of temporary jobs13. The transition rates into temporary jobs are also higher in the 
                                                          
12 Table A.6 in the appendix reports similar estimation results for job losers. 
13 This evidence is not a surprise since Dolado et al. (2002) highlighted it previously: the public sector 
exhibits a steadily increase of the share of temporary employment since the mid-1990s. The reasons may 
be a change in the hiring behaviour after the Growth and Stability Pact and that a high proportion of the 
EC Structural Funds received by the Local Administrations for promoting active labour maket policies 
have been used to hire workers in targeted groups under temporary contracts. 
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agriculture and the building sector compared to workers from the industry. And finally, 
workers in blue-collar (high and low skilled) occupations and those with previous job 
experience are more likely to exit to temporary jobs. 
Other informative results come from the regional unemployment rate and the 
business cycle variables. The unemployed in regions with high unemployment rates 
(associated with higher job destruction and lower job creation rates) present less 
probability of exiting to either temporary or permanent jobs. As for the business cycle 
variable, we obtain the expected result: in seasons when the quarterly GDP rates are 
higher, the transitions from unemployment to temporary jobs increase.  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we have investigated the transitions from unemployment to 
employment and inactivity using a competing risks framework. In particular, we have 
distinguished between job losers and workers without previous job experience, allowing 
for observed and unobserved characteristics to affect the unemployment exit process. 
The unobserved heterogeneity was not significant in our estimations. The possible 
disincentive effects of benefits on exits out of unemployment and the transitions from 
unemployment to temporary or permanent contracts are other issues that have been 
analyzed. Data used have come from the quarterly Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA) 
linked files over the 1992-2004 period. In what follows, we summarize the main 
findings. 
First of all, it is worth noting the notion that employment and inactivity are two 
very distinct behavioural states. For its part, the role of previous labour market 
experience and the type of exit from the last job is critical. We have found that previous 
labour market experience enhances the probability of returning into employment after 
unemployment in the future but does not seem to influence the leaving from the labour 
force. Among job losers, those who entered unemployed due to layoffs exhibit a lower 
probability of transition from U to E, while workers who entered unemployment 
following the termination of a fixed-term contract have noticeably higher probability of 
transitions between jobs with an intermediate unemployment period. Workers 
unemployed due to a voluntary exit from a job are more likely to exit to OLF than the 
rest. 
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Secondly, some personal, job and firm characteristics appear to have an effect on 
the transitions of the unemployed. The influence of seniority on the last job held by the 
individual seems to be a relevant factor: the higher the length of service in previous job, 
the lower the hazard rate from U into E. Moreover, non-claimants exit from 
unemployment (either to E or to OLF) faster than claimants do. This finding suggests 
that benefits not only exerts a negative effect in slowing transitions from unemployment 
to employment but also that the benefits’ disincentive effect translates into a lower 
probability of exiting to inactivity. And male workers, those aged 25-34, and individuals 
living in regions with low unemployment rates (either with and without previous labour 
experience) are those more prone to experience exits from U to E. On the contrary, 
women, the youngest and the oldest job losers exhibit more probability of leaving the 
labour force.  
Finally, the distinction of different destination states within employment (either 
fixed-term or permanent jobs) makes it possible to detect the presence of a dead-end job 
effect in the Spanish labour market during the 1990s, since workers who accepted a 
temporary job in the past were strongly attached to temporary employment in the future. 
They are somehow trapped in a chain of temporary jobs and unemployment with more 
risk of developing worse labour careers and of exclusion from the labour market. This 
issue deserves more attention in order to design adequate policies aimed at preventing 
unemployment and reducing the proportion of temporary employment. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics for all unemployed, unemployed without labour 
experience and job losers. EPA linked files, 1992-2004. 
 ALL W/O EXPER.  JOB LOSERS 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Male 0.554 0.497 0.410 0.492 0.587 0.492 
Age exit (years) 30.628 11.411 23.067 8.004 32.369 11.369 
Age entry (years) 30.628 11.411 23.067 8.004 32.369 11.369 
Age (groups)       
16-24 years old  0.393 0.488 0.751 0.433 0.310 0.463 
25-34 years old  0.293 0.455 0.151 0.358 0.326 0.469 
35-49 years old  0.228 0.419 0.078 0.268 0.263 0.440 
50-64 years old 0.087 0.281 0.021 0.143 0.102 0.302 
Exit from unemployment       
Employment 0.586 0.493 0.332 0.471 0.645 0.479 
Inactivity 0.277 0.447 0.489 0.500 0.228 0.420 
Remain unemployed 0.137 0.344 0.179 0.383 0.127 0.334 
Marital status       
Single 0.583 0.493 0.853 0.354 0.521 0.500 
Married 0.387 0.487 0.132 0.338 0.445 0.497 
Divorced or widow 0.030 0.171 0.015 0.122 0.034 0.180 
Educational level       
Illiterate 0.086 0.281 0.026 0.160 0.100 0.300 
Primary education 0.237 0.425 0.123 0.328 0.263 0.440 
Compulsory education 0.329 0.470 0.308 0.462 0.334 0.472 
Post-compulsory education 0.095 0.293 0.161 0.368 0.080 0.271 
Vocational education 0.150 0.357 0.170 0.376 0.145 0.352 
University degree 0.103 0.304 0.212 0.409 0.078 0.268 
Job category last job       
No 0.187 0.390 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
WCHS 0.072 0.259 0.000 0.000 0.089 0.285 
WCLS 0.203 0.402 0.000 0.000 0.250 0.433 
BCHS 0.220 0.414 0.000 0.000 0.271 0.444 
BCLS 0.317 0.465 0.000 0.000 0.390 0.488 
Cause of exit last job       
Without labour experience 0.187 0.390 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
End of contract 0.656 0.475 0.000 0.000 0.807 0.395 
Layoff 0.059 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.072 0.259 
Other involuntary  0.023 0.150 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.166 
Voluntary 0.075 0.264 0.000 0.000 0.092 0.290 
Unemployment duration(months) 7.341 5.387 7.951 5.866 7.200 5.260 
Last job duration (months) 18.104 47.308 0.000 0.000 18.104 47.308 
Type of sector       
No 0.187 0.390 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Public 0.115 0.319 0.000 0.000 0.141 0.348 
Private 0.676 0.468 0.000 0.000 0.832 0.374 
Else 0.022 0.146 0.000 0.000 0.027 0.161 
Activity sector       
No 0.187 0.390 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Agriculture 0.133 0.339 0.000 0.000 0.163 0.370 
Industry 0.126 0.332 0.000 0.000 0.155 0.362 
Building 0.148 0.355 0.000 0.000 0.181 0.385 
Service 0.406 0.491 0.000 0.000 0.500 0.500 
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Continuation Table 1. 
 
Future job contract       
No (unemployed or inactive) 0.414 0.493 0.668 0.471 0.355 0.479
Permanent 0.032 0.176 0.018 0.134 0.035 0.184
Temporary 0.533 0.499 0.297 0.457 0.588 0.492
Self employment 0.021 0.142 0.017 0.129 0.022 0.145
Job search (previous situation)       
Worked 0.742 0.438 0.025 0.156 0.907 0.291
Studied 0.160 0.367 0.717 0.450 0.032 0.176
Military service 0.017 0.130 0.043 0.203 0.011 0.106
Domestic work 0.051 0.220 0.147 0.354 0.029 0.167
Else 0.030 0.170 0.068 0.252 0.021 0.144
Year (entry) 1997.519 3.339 1997.356 3.195 1997.557 3.371
Total sample 14,861 2,782 12,079 
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Table A.2. Explanatory variables. 
Variables Definition 
Gender 2 categories: man, woman. 
Age 4 categories: 16-24 years old, 25-34 years old; 35-49 years old, 
50-64 years old. 
Marital status 3 categories: single, married, divorced/widow. 
Relation with the person of 
reference 
4 categories: reference person, partner, son/daughter, others. 
Educational level  6 categories: Illiterate, primary education, compulsory 
education, post-compulsory education, vocational education, 
university degree. 
Job category last job 4 categories: : WCHS (white collar high skilled); WCLS (white 
collar low skilled); BCHS (blue collar high skilled); BCLS (blue 
collar low skilled). 
Cause of exit last job 4 categories: end of contract, layoff, other involuntary reasons, 
voluntary reasons 
Type of sector 3 categories: public, private, else. 
Industry 4 categories: agriculture, industry, building, service. 
Job search previous situation 5 categories: working, studying, military service, domestic work, 
else. 
Unemployment rate Quarterly unemployment rate. 
Region of residence 17 categories: Andalucia, Aragon, Asturias, Baleares,Canarias, 
Cantabria, Castilla-Mancha, Castilla-León, Catalonia, 
Comunidad Valenciana, Extremadura, Galicia, Madrid, Murcia, 
Navarra, Pais Vasco, La Rioja. 
Benefits 2 categories: yes, no. 
Search for a job of… 5 categories: only full-time, full-time or part-time, only part-
time, part-time or full-time, whatever. 
Accept a job in a different 
city? 
3 categories: yes, no, I don’t know. 
Accept a job in different 
occupation? 
3 categories: yes, no, I don’t know. 
Accept a job with less 
income? 
3 categories: yes, no, I don’t know. 
Accept a job with lower 
category? 
3 categories: yes, no, I don’t know. 
Dummies entry quarter 4 categories: 1st quarter (January to March), 2nd quarter (April to 
June), 3rd (July to September), 4thquarter (October to December).
Dummies exit quarter 4 categories: 1st quarter (January to March), 2nd quarter (April to 
June), 3rd (July to September), 4thquarter (October to December).
Dummy year variables 12 categories: 1992,1993,………2003. 
Previous experience 2 categories: Yes, no. 
Previous job duration Months. 
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Table A.3. Estimation results for all unemployed, job losers and workers without previous labour experience (U= unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-
2004). Third order polynomial baseline hazard function and two support points. 
 ALL JOB LOSERS WITHOUT LABOUR EXPERIENCE 
 U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Baseline hazard function                   
t 1.824 0.045 *** 2.068 0.053 *** 1.840 0.051 *** 2.031 0.064 *** 1.540 0.111 *** 2.191 0.108 *** 
t2 -0.157 0.005 *** -0.190 0.006 *** -0.161 0.006 *** -0.183 0.008 *** -0.113 0.013 *** -0.203 0.013 *** 
t3 0.004 0.000 *** 0.005 0.000 *** 0.004 0.000 *** 0.004 0.000 *** 0.002 0.000 *** 0.006 0.000 *** 
Gender (women) -0.166 0.043 *** -0.188 0.052 *** -0.148 0.049 *** -0.087 0.069  -0.202 0.089 ** -0.285 0.086 *** 
Age groups                   
16-24 -0.027 0.043  0.382 0.060 *** 0.001 0.046  0.453 0.067 *** -0.305 0.126 ** 0.039 0.136  
25-34 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.279 0.048 *** -0.285 0.065 *** -0.261 0.050 *** -0.265 0.069 *** -0.610 0.260 ** -0.364 0.211 * 
50-64 -0.729 0.073 *** 0.176 0.087 ** -0.731 0.075 *** 0.201 0.092 ** -0.737 0.403 * -0.126 0.292  
Marital status                   
Married 0.152 0.066 ** -0.598 0.096 *** 0.165 0.068 ** -0.509 0.101 *** 0.932 0.440 ** -0.395 0.531  
Single, widow or 
divorced - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women and married -0.554 0.103 *** 1.053 0.128 *** -0.593 0.108 *** 0.899 0.140 *** -1.246 0.502 ** 0.985 0.573 * 
Type of sector                   
Public 0.133 0.051 *** 0.116 0.071 * 0.130 0.051 *** 0.130 0.071 * - - - - - - 
Private or else - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cause of exit last job                   
End of contract 0.146 0.062 ** -0.276 0.075 *** 0.197 0.062 *** -0.347 0.073 *** - - - - - - 
Layoff -0.239 0.087 *** -0.330 0.111 *** -0.184 0.088 ** -0.417 0.109 *** - - - - - - 
Other involuntary  -0.049 0.115  -0.262 0.153 * 0.022 0.116  -0.345 0.152 ** - - - - - - 
Voluntary - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Educational level                   
No studies - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Primary -0.027 0.065  -0.408 0.079 *** -0.024 0.066  -0.390 0.083 *** 0.477 0.360  -0.545 0.258 ** 
EGB 0.034 0.069  -0.421 0.084 *** 0.037 0.071  -0.429 0.090 *** 0.550 0.353  -0.543 0.259 ** 
BUP -0.104 0.086  0.007 0.098  -0.060 0.092  -0.058 0.111  0.296 0.369  -0.036 0.272  
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FP 0.112 0.077  -0.485 0.096 *** 0.096 0.081  -0.458 0.106 *** 0.781 0.359 ** -0.690 0.271 *** 
University 0.066 0.088  -0.561 0.106 *** 0.116 0.097  -0.517 0.127 *** 0.506 0.360  -0.873 0.276 *** 
Job category last job                   
WCHS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
WCLS 0.022 0.069  -0.047 0.094  0.083 0.071  -0.175 0.092 * - - - - - - 
BCHS 0.196 0.076 *** 0.062 0.107  0.294 0.078 *** -0.085 0.104  - - - - - - 
BCLS 0.171 0.071 ** 0.158 0.096 * 0.249 0.074 *** 0.051 0.096  - - - - - - 
Industry                   
Agriculture 0.441 0.067 *** 0.538 0.092 *** 0.460 0.067 *** 0.514 0.092 *** - - - - - - 
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Building 0.163 0.058 *** -0.005 0.092  0.197 0.058 *** -0.038 0.090  - - - - - - 
Service 0.049 0.058  0.126 0.081  0.103 0.058 * 0.003 0.077  - - - - - - 
GDP rate 0.066 0.017 *** 0.030 0.021  0.070 0.018 *** 0.024 0.025  0.037 0.047  0.046 0.043  
Reg. Unemployment rate -0.008 0.003 *** 0.004 0.003  -0.006 0.003 * 0.001 0.004  -0.026 0.007 *** 0.008 0.007  
Benefits (yes) -0.105 0.037 *** -0.227 0.054 *** -0.107 0.037 *** -0.220 0.054 *** - - - - - - 
Previous situation (job 
search) 
                  
Working - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Studying -0.143 0.081 * 0.574 0.088 *** -0.214 0.111 ** 0.919 0.114 *** -0.147 0.117  0.506 0.128 *** 
Domestic work -0.187 0.099 * 0.200 0.094 ** -0.207 0.124 * 0.243 0.116 ** -0.116 0.213  -0.128 0.211  
Else (military service, 
etc.) -0.001 0.079  -0.016 0.102  -0.026 0.094  -0.013 0.133  - - - - - - 
Search for a job of:                   
Only full-time 0.299 0.044 *** 0.200 0.060 *** 0.313 0.046 *** 0.231 0.068 *** 0.252 0.134 * 0.143 0.132  
Full-time or part time 0.047 0.034  -0.043 0.045  0.047 0.037  -0.008 0.052  0.097 0.091  -0.080 0.089  
Part time or full-time -0.524 0.135 *** 0.218 0.111 * -0.567 0.156 *** 0.317 0.136 *** -0.284 0.269  0.066 0.200  
Only part-time -0.402 0.114 *** 0.404 0.091 *** -0.364 0.135 *** 0.425 0.118 *** -0.435 0.214 ** 0.275 0.155 * 
Accept a job in another 
city, occupation, of less 
income, with lower 
category? 
                  
Yes (all) -0.472 0.048 *** -0.829 0.065 *** -0.468 0.052 *** -0.804 0.078 *** -0.473 0.124 *** -0.854 0.128 *** 
At least one -0.426 0.037 *** -0.564 0.046 *** -0.434 0.040 *** -0.655 0.054 *** -0.397 0.095 *** -0.333 0.089 *** 
No/I don´t know - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dummies exit                   
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1st quarter - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
2nd quarter 0.098 0.038 *** -0.044 0.051  0.094 0.041 ** -0.038 0.060  0.083 0.110  -0.096 0.101  
3rd quarter 0.145 0.039 *** 0.041 0.051  0.136 0.042 *** -0.026 0.061  0.114 0.108  0.116 0.098  
4th quarter 0.211 0.038 *** 0.174 0.050 *** 0.208 0.041 *** 0.104 0.059 * 0.234 0.108 ** 0.296 0.095 *** 
Previous experience (yes) 0.427 0.116 *** -0.103 0.142  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dummy years                   
1992 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1993 -0.090 0.079  -0.342 0.095 *** -0.091 0.084  -0.379 0.110 *** -0.020 0.227  -0.218 0.199  
1994 0.122 0.091  -0.252 0.112 ** 0.134 0.098  -0.305 0.135 ** 0.088 0.246  -0.115 0.212  
1995 0.167 0.089 * -0.312 0.111 *** 0.193 0.097 ** -0.386 0.133 *** -0.001 0.241  -0.230 0.210  
1996 0.205 0.094 ** -0.290 0.117 *** 0.211 0.101 ** -0.332 0.139 *** 0.149 0.256  -0.228 0.227  
1997 0.290 0.108 *** -0.203 0.136  0.302 0.116 *** -0.270 0.162 * 0.242 0.299  -0.038 0.264  
1998 0.445 0.106 *** 0.134 0.131  0.448 0.115 *** 0.144 0.155  0.418 0.290  0.123 0.259  
1999 0.396 0.112 *** -0.005 0.139  0.392 0.121 *** 0.013 0.164  0.399 0.300  -0.069 0.271  
2000 0.662 0.104 *** 0.254 0.131 ** 0.646 0.112 *** 0.206 0.152  0.627 0.287 ** 0.281 0.276  
2001 0.556 0.100 *** 0.265 0.122 ** 0.568 0.108 *** 0.266 0.142 * 0.506 0.260 ** 0.190 0.242  
2002 0.609 0.091 *** 0.660 0.107 *** 0.669 0.099 *** 0.681 0.125 *** 0.224 0.253  0.512 0.220 ** 
2003 0.629 0.100 *** 0.625 0.119 *** 0.662 0.107 *** 0.581 0.138 *** 0.345 0.287  0.605 0.258 ** 
Mass points and probability                   
ε1 (s.e.) -9.068(0.185) -8.841(0.209) -9.079(0.506) 
ε2 (s.e.) -5.309(0.156) -5.183(0.175) -4.843(0.449) 
Pr(ε1) 0.542 0.540 0.547 
Pr(ε2) 0.458 0.460 0.453 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 111,155 88,356 22,799 
Likelihood function -43,896.299 -35,438.002 -8,357.204 
a These estimations also include the following variables: relation with reference person and third orden polynomial for  the baseline hazard rates. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table A.4. Estimation results on previous job tenure for all the unemployed and for job losers  (U= 
unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-2004). Third order polynomial 
baseline hazard function and two support points. 
 ALL JOB LOSERS 
 U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Previous job tenure             
0-6 months - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6-12 months -0.065 0.048  -0.173 0.071 ** -0.077 0.048 * -0.173 0.071 ** 
12-24 months -0.191 0.067 *** -0.103 0.095  -0.212 0.067 *** -0.112 0.095  
24-36 months- -0.235 0.077 *** -0.205 0.109 * -0.255 0.077 *** -0.219 0.108 ** 
More than 36 months -0.613 0.067 *** -0.193 0.083 ** -0.646 0.069 *** -0.200 0.084 ** 
Mass points and probability             
ε1 (s.e.) -8.898(0.181)*** -8.716(0.205) 
ε2 (s.e.) -5.137(0.150)*** -5.056(0.171) 
Pr(ε1) 0.543 0.541 
Pr(ε2) 0.457 0.459 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 111,155 88,356 
Likelihood function -43,908.937 -35,436.31 
a These estimations also include the whole set of variables included in Table A.3 except the cause of exit from last job and the 
unemployment benefits variables. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table A.5. Estimation results for workers who entered unemployment due to either the end of contract or 
layoff (U= unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-2004). Third order 
polynomial baseline hazard function and two support points. 
 
 Previous end of contract Previous Layoff 
 U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Baseline hazard function             
t 1.916 0.057 *** 2.058 0.073 *** 1.566 0.174 *** 1.472 0.220 *** 
t2 -0.169 0.007 *** -0.187 0.009 *** -0.136 0.020 *** -0.111 0.026 *** 
t3 0.004 0.000 *** 0.005 0.000 *** 0.004 0.001 *** 0.003 0.001 *** 
Gender (women) -0.151 0.054 *** -0.103 0.077  -0.224 0.222  -0.648 0.326 ** 
Age groups             
16-24 -0.046 0.050  0.444 0.075 *** 0.275 0.196  0.492 0.299 * 
25-34 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.236 0.055 *** -0.258 0.079 *** -0.477 0.205 ** -0.366 0.283  
50-64 -0.640 0.084 *** 0.169 0.108  -1.221 0.297 *** 0.172 0.350  
Marital status             
Married 0.180 0.076 ** -0.717 0.117 0.000 0.720 0.285 ** -0.336 0.356  
Single, widow or 
divorced - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women and married -0.594 0.126 *** 0.977 0.171 *** -1.988 0.497 *** 0.999 0.553 * 
Type of sector             
Public 0.112 0.054 ** 0.119 0.075  0.129 0.331  0.750 0.372 ** 
Private or else - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Educational level             
Illiterate - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Primary education -0.016 0.073  -0.415 0.095 *** 0.121 0.301  -0.558 0.339 * 
Compulsory education 0.062 0.078  -0.430 0.102 *** 0.244 0.324  -0.824 0.381 ** 
Post-compulsory 
education -0.028 0.103  -0.080 0.128  0.205 0.362  -0.709 0.444  
Vocational education 0.144 0.089  -0.375 0.120 *** -0.020 0.338  -1.280 0.425 *** 
University degree 0.129 0.108  -0.487 0.146 *** -0.282 0.453  -1.769 0.578 *** 
Job category last job             
WCHS - - - - - - - - - - - - 
WCLS 0.018 0.083  -0.212 0.111 * 0.060 0.287  -0.560 0.352  
BCHS 0.214 0.092 ** -0.157 0.126  0.483 0.304  -0.439 0.375  
BCLS 0.153 0.087 * -0.045 0.117  0.417 0.285  -0.482 0.346  
Industry             
Agriculture 0.403 0.073 *** 0.534 0.103 *** 0.826 0.324 *** 0.683 0.424 0.107 
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Building 0.137 0.065 ** 0.003 0.102  0.389 0.234 * -0.287 0.361  
Service 0.045 0.065  -0.029 0.092  0.346 0.211  0.015 0.276  
GDP rate 0.066 0.020 *** 0.050 0.028 * 0.020 0.066  -0.056 0.097  
Reg. Unemployment rate -0.006 0.003 * 0.000 0.005  -0.023 0.013 * 0.013 0.017  
Benefits (yes) -0.051 0.041  -0.208 0.061 *** -0.034 0.143  -0.335 0.193 * 
Previous situation (job 
search) 
            
Working - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Studying -0.202 0.125  0.996 0.129 *** -0.620 0.893  0.940 0.851  
Domestic work -0.503 0.188 *** 0.349 0.163 ** 1.088 0.504 ** 0.794 0.502  
Else (military service, 
etc.) -0.090 0.124  -0.084 0.179  -0.108 0.481  0.042 0.615  
Search for a job of:             
Only full-time 0.395 0.052 *** 0.332 0.078 *** -0.207 0.184  -0.123 0.238  
Full-time or part time 0.077 0.041 * 0.011 0.059  -0.079 0.150  -0.234 0.208  
Part time or full-time -0.667 0.187 *** 0.410 0.160 *** 0.018 0.648  0.109 0.547  
Only part-time -0.221 0.165  0.610 0.148 *** -0.639 0.509  -0.869 0.587  
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Accept a job in another 
city, occupation, of less 
income , with lower 
category? 
Yes (all) -0.443 0.162 *** -0.967 0.279 *** -1.439 1.068  -0.171 1.079  
At least one -0.537 0.046 *** -0.788 0.065 *** -0.153 0.168  -0.566 0.206 *** 
No/I don´t know - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Previous job tenure 
(months) -0.004 0.001 *** -0.001 0.001  -0.002 0.001 ** 0.002 0.001 * 
Dummy years             
1992 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1993 -0.024 0.095  -0.402 0.126 *** -0.406 0.318  -0.049 0.465  
1994 0.201 0.111 * -0.356 0.155 ** -0.185 0.372  -0.136 0.543  
1995 0.326 0.107 *** -0.382 0.150 *** 0.014 0.384  -0.344 0.551  
1996 0.310 0.113 *** -0.450 0.156 *** -0.284 0.444  -0.022 0.597  
1997 0.346 0.130 *** -0.462 0.183 *** 0.131 0.473  -0.228 0.754  
1998 0.551 0.128 *** 0.087 0.173  0.601 0.453  0.707 0.644  
1999 0.445 0.135 *** -0.127 0.184  0.634 0.493  0.943 0.678  
2000 0.707 0.126 *** 0.083 0.173  0.312 0.442  0.971 0.614  
2001 0.559 0.122 *** 0.059 0.163  1.439 0.446 *** 1.617 0.609 *** 
2002 0.705 0.110 *** 0.595 0.141 *** 0.716 0.381 * 1.956 0.512 *** 
2003 0.736 0.120 *** 0.444 0.158 *** 0.724 0.415 * 1.625 0.555 *** 
Mass points and probability   
ε1 (s.e.) -8.785(0.233)*** -8.049(0.814)*** 
ε2 (s.e.) -5.102(0.197)*** -4.341(0.679)*** 
Pr(ε1) 0.536 0.611 
Pr(ε2) 0.464 0.389 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 69,841 7,812 
Log Likelihood function -28,497.460 -2,485.687 
a These estimations also include the following variables: relation with reference person, dummies of exit and dummies for the 
baseline hazard rates. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table A.6. Estimation results for transitions from U to permanent job, temporary job, 
self-employment or OLF (U= unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked 
files (1992-2004). Job losers. 
 JOB LOSERS 
 U→permanent job U→temporary job U→ self-employment U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Gender (women) 0.136 0.143  -0.124 0.037 *** -0.524 0.215 *** 0.011 0.061  
Age groups             
16-24 0.179 0.137  -0.044 0.035  -0.358 0.186 * 0.446 0.060 *** 
25-34 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.443 0.147 *** -0.255 0.038 *** -0.117 0.178  -0.133 0.061 ** 
50-64 -0.603 0.215 *** -0.671 0.058 *** -1.024 0.300 *** 0.432 0.079 *** 
Marital status             
Married 0.206 0.197  0.132 0.052 *** 0.123 0.262  -0.328 0.094 *** 
Single, widow or 
divorced - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women and married -0.211 0.291  -0.563 0.084 *** -0.633 0.522  0.809 0.123 *** 
Type of sector              
Public -0.425 0.176 ** 0.143 0.039 *** -0.381 0.256  0.082 0.061  
Private or else - -  - - - - - - - - - 
Cause of exit last job             
End of contract -0.356 0.153 ** 0.199 0.051 *** -0.985 0.181 *** -0.288 0.063 *** 
Layoff -0.170 0.206  -0.200 0.071 *** -1.145 0.281 *** -0.306 0.094 *** 
Other involuntary  -0.796 0.371 ** -0.074 0.098  0.344 0.249  -0.248 0.134 * 
Voluntary - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Educational level             
No studies - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Primary -0.137 0.222  -0.087 0.051 * 0.485 0.269 * -0.206 0.075 *** 
EGB 0.048 0.231  -0.055 0.054  0.396 0.293  -0.177 0.081 ** 
BUP 0.346 0.269  -0.183 0.072 ** 0.034 0.410  0.224 0.099 ** 
FP -0.003 0.259  -0.046 0.062  0.362 0.334  -0.255 0.096 *** 
University 0.055 0.304  -0.046 0.077  0.423 0.402  -0.192 0.117 * 
Job category last job             
WCHS - - - - - - - - - - - - 
WCLS -0.149 0.199  0.055 0.057  -0.591 0.249 ** -0.037 0.084  
BCHS 0.356 0.223  0.188 0.063 *** -0.350 0.262  0.162 0.098 * 
BCLS 0.194 0.206  0.153 0.060 *** -0.748 0.259 *** 0.194 0.089 ** 
Industry             
Agriculture -0.572 0.235 *** 0.433 0.051 *** 0.295 0.237  0.544 0.081 *** 
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Building -0.290 0.176 * 0.189 0.045 *** 0.070 0.195  0.053 0.082  
Service 0.271 0.157 * 0.063 0.045  -0.137 0.219  0.162 0.071 ** 
GDP rate 0.056 0.043  0.026 0.012 ** 0.063 0.055  -0.089 0.018 *** 
Reg. Unemployment rate -0.013 0.009  -0.009 0.002 *** 0.000 0.011  0.008 0.004 ** 
Benefits (yes) -0.094 0.114  -0.041 0.029  -0.504 0.149 *** -0.131 0.048 *** 
Constant -5.329 0.686 *** -3.475 0.177 *** -3.987 0.765 *** -3.652 0.235 *** 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 88,356 
Likelihood function -38,045.524 
a These estimations also include all the variables included in Table 3. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 1. Specification tests. 
Test for IIA 
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are 
independent of other alternatives 
 
χ2(P>χ2) 
Hausman 
Omitted: Employment 
Omitted: OLF 
 
 
5.109(1.00) 
2.504(1.00) 
Small-Hsiao 
Omitted: Employment 
Omitted: OLF 
 
 
40.881(0.978) 
54.207(0.719) 
Wald and LR test for combining outcomes 
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated 
with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories 
can be collapsed) 
 
Wald test 
Comb.employment and OLF 
Comb.employment and unemployment 
Comb. OLF and unemployment 
 
LR test 
Comb.employment and OLF 
Comb.employment and unemployment 
Comb. OLF and unemployment 
 
 
2337.950(0.00) 
3267.025(0.00) 
2461.934 (0.00) 
 
 
2646.359(0.00) 
4284.823(0.00) 
3748.929(0.00) 
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Table 2. Specification tests for number of mass points (unobserved heterogeneity). 
 
 All sample Job losers Workers without 
previous experience 
Test for number of mass points χ2(P>χ2) χ2(P>χ2) χ2(P>χ2) 
LR test 
(H0:unobserved heterogeneity (two mass 
points) is 0) 
 
1.144(0.564) 
 
0.922(0.631)
 
1.591(0.451) 
Information Criteria All sample Job losers Workers without 
previous experience 
AIC IC IC IC 
No mass points -44195.307 -35695.450 -8483.166 
Two mass points -44194.735 -35694.989 -8483.000 
BIC    
No mass points -44067.830 -35569.923 -8381.345 
Two mass points -44067.258 -35569.462 -8381.179 
HIQ    
No mass points -44066.010 -35568.144 -8379.805 
Two mass points -44065.438 -35567.683 -8379.639 
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Table 3. Estimation results for  the entire sample, job losers and workers without previous labour experience (U= unemploy., OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-2004). 
 ALL JOB LOSERS WITHOUT LABOUR EXPERIENCE 
 U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Gender (women) -0.144 0.032 *** -0.130 0.044 *** -0.122 0.036 *** 0.010 0.061  -0.224 0.076 *** -0.244 0.065 *** 
Age groups                   
16-24 -0.060 0.032 * 0.406 0.052 *** -0.040 0.034  0.460 0.060 *** -0.231 0.105 ** 0.186 0.108 * 
25-34 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.269 0.036 *** -0.110 0.056 ** -0.260 0.036 *** -0.141 0.061 ** -0.427 0.226 * 0.133 0.158  
50-64 -0.691 0.055 *** 0.412 0.073 *** -0.680 0.055 *** 0.420 0.079 *** -0.825 0.371 *** 0.289 0.221  
Marital status                   
Married 0.130 0.049 *** -0.403 0.088 *** 0.139 0.050 *** -0.320 0.094 *** 0.252 0.411  -0.197 0.434  
Single, widow or 
divorced - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women and married -0.528 0.078 *** 0.926 0.111 *** -0.539 0.081 *** 0.795 0.122 *** -0.752 0.461 * 0.640 0.455  
Type of sector                    
Public 0.102 0.038 *** 0.083 0.061  0.102 0.038 *** 0.086 0.061  - - - - - - 
Private or else - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cause of exit last job                   
End of contract 0.107 0.047 ** -0.292 0.063 *** 0.103 0.047 ** -0.290 0.063 *** - - - - - - 
Layoff -0.241 0.066 *** -0.311 0.094 *** -0.241 0.066 *** -0.305 0.094 *** - - - - - - 
Other involuntary  -0.026 0.088  -0.305 0.132 ** -0.035 0.089  -0.238 0.134 * - - - - - - 
Voluntary - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Educational level                   
Illiterate - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Primary education -0.075 0.048  -0.238 0.069 *** -0.067 0.049  -0.208 0.075 *** -0.160 0.288  -0.422 0.181 ** 
Compulsory education -0.042 0.051  -0.216 0.074 *** -0.035 0.052  -0.188 0.082 ** -0.078 0.281  -0.382 0.180 ** 
Post-compulsory 
education -0.180 0.066 *** 0.179 0.085 ** -0.137 0.069 ** 0.215 0.099 ** -0.402 0.298  0.005 0.189  
Vocational education -0.019 0.058  -0.365 0.084 *** -0.031 0.060  -0.264 0.096 *** 0.061 0.286  -0.629 0.191 *** 
University degree -0.037 0.067  -0.361 0.093 *** -0.029 0.074  -0.201 0.117 * -0.141 0.287  -0.659 0.195 *** 
Job category last job                   
WCHS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
WCLS 0.019 0.053  -0.071 0.081  0.013 0.054  -0.037 0.084  - - - - - - 
BCHS 0.165 0.058 *** 0.067 0.093  0.168 0.060 *** 0.167 0.098 * - - - - - - 
BCLS 0.120 0.054 ** 0.089 0.083  0.117 0.056 ** 0.193 0.089 ** - - - - - - 
Industry                   
Agriculture 0.396 0.048 *** 0.467 0.079 *** 0.380 0.049 *** 0.517 0.081 *** - - - - - - 
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Building 0.155 0.043 *** -0.002 0.082  0.156 0.043 *** 0.042 0.082  - - - - - - 
Service 0.069 0.043 * 0.150 0.071 ** 0.066 0.043  0.158 0.071 ** - - - - - - 
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GDP rate 0.042 0.013 *** 0.002 0.019  0.045 0.014 *** -0.011 0.022  0.027 0.041  0.029 0.034  
Reg. Unemployment rate -0.010 0.002 *** 0.013 0.003 *** -0.008 0.002 *** 0.013 0.004 *** -0.030 0.006 *** 0.014 0.005 *** 
Benefits (yes) -0.059 0.028 ** -0.142 0.047 *** -0.061 0.028 ** -0.135 0.048 *** - - - - - - 
Previous situation (job 
search) 
                  
Working - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Studying -0.192 0.065 *** 0.718 0.073 *** -0.160 0.085 * 0.970 0.091 *** -0.140 0.100  0.479 0.104 *** 
Domestic work -0.267 0.082 *** 0.294 0.076 *** -0.272 0.101 *** 0.236 0.095 *** -0.146 0.187  0.086 0.165  
Else (military service, 
etc.) -0.046 0.061  0.085 0.088  -0.025 0.071  0.002 0.119  - - - - - - 
Search for a job of:                   
Only full-time 0.234 0.033 *** 0.174 0.051 *** 0.241 0.034 *** 0.225 0.060 *** 0.179 0.114  0.077 0.103  
Full-time or part time 0.024 0.027  -0.030 0.039  0.022 0.028  0.014 0.047  0.046 0.079  -0.098 0.071  
Part time or full-time -0.387 0.113 *** 0.383 0.088 *** -0.440 0.130 *** 0.500 0.113 *** -0.176 0.231  0.208 0.144  
Only part-time -0.258 0.094 *** 0.502 0.070 *** -0.236 0.109 ** 0.516 0.097 *** -0.294 0.188  0.417 0.104 *** 
Accept a job in another 
city, occupation, of less 
income, with lower 
category? 
                  
Yes (all) -0.242 0.038 *** -0.514 0.059 *** -0.245 0.041 *** -0.516 0.072 *** -0.230 0.111 ** -0.480 0.106 *** 
At least one -0.239 0.031 *** -0.295 0.042 *** -0.244 0.033 *** -0.395 0.051 *** -0.221 0.089 *** -0.100 0.075  
No/I don´t know - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Previous experience (yes) 0.316 0.091 *** 0.034 0.120  - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dummy years                   
1992 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1993 -0.050 0.060  -0.144 0.081 * -0.049 0.063  -0.178 0.097 * -0.051 0.188  -0.064 0.148  
1994 0.100 0.070  -0.133 0.098  0.118 0.074  -0.139 0.122  -0.084 0.213  -0.100 0.169  
1995 0.166 0.068 ** -0.171 0.097 * 0.189 0.072 *** -0.237 0.121 ** -0.087 0.209  -0.063 0.167  
1996 0.164 0.071 ** -0.179 0.103 * 0.175 0.075 *** -0.190 0.126  0.034 0.218  -0.159 0.179  
1997 0.283 0.083 *** -0.064 0.121  0.311 0.087 *** -0.056 0.147  0.039 0.257  -0.053 0.215  
1998 0.340 0.082 *** 0.221 0.117 * 0.348 0.087 *** 0.280 0.142 ** 0.214 0.248  0.129 0.207  
1999 0.365 0.087 *** 0.225 0.124 * 0.363 0.092 *** 0.285 0.151 * 0.286 0.261  0.094 0.220  
2000 0.476 0.083 *** 0.374 0.118 *** 0.462 0.088 *** 0.359 0.141 *** 0.468 0.248 * 0.409 0.217 * 
2001 0.458 0.076 *** 0.484 0.107 *** 0.472 0.080 *** 0.536 0.129 *** 0.300 0.226  0.353 0.195 *** 
2002 0.458 0.070 *** 0.790 0.095 *** 0.497 0.073 *** 0.838 0.114 *** 0.110 0.220  0.695 0.173 *** 
2003 0.420 0.077 *** 0.717 0.104 *** 0.448 0.081 *** 0.697 0.124 *** 0.132 0.246  0.758 0.197 *** 
Constant -3.248 0.150 *** -3.776 0.193 *** -3.207 0.169 *** -3.736 0.236 *** -1.770 0.456 *** -3.599 0.406 *** 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 111,155 88,356 22,799 
Likelihood function -44,065.307 -35,567.45 -8,379.166   
a These estimations also include the following variables: relation with reference person, dummies exit and monthly dummies for the baseline hazard rates. b ***  indicates 
significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 4. Estimation results on previous job tenure for all the unemployed and for job losers  (U= 
unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-2004). 
 ALL JOB LOSERS 
 U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Previous job tenure             
0-6 months - - - - - - - - - - - - 
6-12 months -0.079 0.036 ** -0.123 0.063 ** -0.097 0.036 *** -0.103 0.064  
12-24 months -0.187 0.050 *** -0.041 0.082  -0.207 0.051 *** -0.009 0.083  
24-36 months- -0.220 0.058 *** -0.132 0.096  -0.243 0.058 *** -0.104 0.097  
More than 36 months -0.491 0.050 *** 0.015 0.069  -0.523 0.051 *** 0.068 0.071  
Observations (indiv.-spell) 111,155 88,356 
Likelihood function -44,060.955     -35,544.965 
a These estimations also include the whole set of variables included in Table 3 except the causeof exit from last job and the 
unemployment benefits variables. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 5. Estimation results for workers who entered unemployment due to either the end of contract or 
layoff (U= unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-2004). 
 Previous end of contract Previous Layoff 
 U→JOB U→OLF U→JOB U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Gender (women) -0.118 0.039 *** 0.012 0.069  -0.081 0.156  -0.363 0.285  
Age groups             
16-24 -0.083 0.037 ** 0.479 0.068 *** 0.257 0.145 * 0.408 0.264  
25-34 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.242 0.040 *** -0.117 0.070 * -0.276 0.139 ** -0.209 0.234  
50-64 -0.628 0.061 *** 0.377 0.094 *** -0.915 0.209 *** 0.439 0.281  
Marital status             
Married 0.160 0.056 *** -0.456 0.110 *** 0.392 0.191 ** -0.404 0.312  
Single, widow or 
divorced - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women and married -0.523 0.092 *** 0.846 0.150 *** -1.313 0.307 *** 1.271 0.417 *** 
Type of sector              
Public 0.080 0.040 ** 0.098 0.066  0.067 0.258  0.863 0.322 *** 
Private or else - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Educational level             
Illiterate - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Primary education -0.058 0.053  -0.196 0.085 ** -0.071 0.216  -0.461 0.280 * 
Compulsory education -0.018 0.057  -0.159 0.093 * 0.147 0.232  -0.542 0.324 * 
Post-compulsory 
education -0.129 0.077 * 0.225 0.116 ** -0.023 0.269  -0.597 0.384  
Vocational education -0.006 0.066  -0.151 0.110  -0.187 0.254  -0.970 0.367 *** 
University degree -0.053 0.081  -0.106 0.135  -0.044 0.325  -1.318 0.496 *** 
Job category last job             
WCHS - - - - - - - - - - - - 
WCLS -0.074 0.063  0.003 0.106  0.257 0.211  -0.345 0.271  
BCHS 0.060 0.070  0.200 0.122 * 0.539 0.224 ** -0.089 0.302  
BCLS 0.011 0.066  0.217 0.112 ** 0.454 0.216 ** -0.196 0.286  
Industry             
Agriculture 0.329 0.053 *** 0.599 0.093 *** 0.328 0.237  0.507 0.362  
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Building 0.100 0.048 ** 0.123 0.096  0.168 0.160  -0.357 0.308  
Service 0.019 0.048  0.169 0.085 ** 0.137 0.150  0.039 0.220  
GDP rate 0.041 0.015 *** 0.013 0.026  -0.003 0.054  -0.094 0.085  
Reg. Unemployment rate -0.009 0.002 *** 0.014 0.004 *** -0.019 0.009 ** 0.025 0.016  
Benefits (yes) -0.017 0.031  -0.118 0.054 ** -0.052 0.110  -0.180 0.169  
Previous situation (job 
search) 
            
Working - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Studying -0.135 0.099  1.055 0.106 *** -0.519 0.536  0.911 0.556 * 
Domestic work -0.523 0.155 *** 0.332 0.130 *** 0.491 0.333  0.456 0.409  
Else (military service, 
etc.) -0.077 0.091  -0.044 0.158  0.098 0.317  0.248 0.498  
Search for a job of:             
Only full-time 0.266 0.038 *** 0.245 0.069 *** -0.043 0.132  0.051 0.202  
Full-time or part time 0.036 0.031  0.007 0.054  -0.071 0.114  -0.221 0.183  
Part time or full-time -0.562 0.155 *** 0.576 0.128 *** 0.312 0.546  0.296 0.474  
Only part-time -0.092 0.128  0.635 0.122 *** -0.631 0.449  -0.946 0.550 * 
Accept a job in another 
city, occupation, of less 
income , with lower 
category? 
            
Yes (all) -0.287 0.045 *** -0.489 0.082 *** -0.103 0.173  -0.451 0.302  
At least one -0.278 0.037 *** -0.340 0.060 *** -0.128 0.130  -0.523 0.178 *** 
No/I don´t know - - - - - - - - - - - - 
 -0.004 0.001 *** 0.001 0.001  -0.002 0.001 *** 0.002 0.001 *** 
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Previous job tenure 
(months) 
Dummies exit             
1st quarter - - -          
2nd quarter 0.092 0.038 *** -0.024 0.065  -0.210 0.141  0.181 0.212  
3rd quarter 0.098 0.038 *** 0.041 0.065  0.075 0.134  0.132 0.213  
4th quarter 0.142 0.038 *** 0.106 0.064 * 0.035 0.137  0.120 0.216  
Dummy years             
1992 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
1993 0.030 0.070  -0.140 0.112  -0.433 0.240 * -0.139 0.373  
1994 0.178 0.083 ** -0.159 0.141  -0.009 0.280  0.120 0.465  
1995 0.276 0.080 *** -0.220 0.137  0.166 0.279  -0.272 0.482  
1996 0.271 0.083 *** -0.261 0.143 * -0.201 0.320  0.159 0.536  
1997 0.346 0.097 *** -0.184 0.168  0.367 0.350  0.018 0.633  
1998 0.415 0.097 *** 0.252 0.160  0.496 0.355  0.618 0.586  
1999 0.389 0.102 *** 0.201 0.170  0.638 0.372 * 0.808 0.615  
2000 0.511 0.097 *** 0.306 0.161 * 0.352 0.352  1.035 0.570 * 
2001 0.481 0.089 *** 0.446 0.148 *** 0.898 0.325 *** 1.267 0.546 *** 
2002 0.521 0.081 *** 0.825 0.129 *** 0.450 0.296  1.749 0.477 *** 
2003 0.477 0.089 *** 0.622 0.142 *** 0.537 0.313 * 1.393 0.498 *** 
Constant -3.015 0.186 *** -4.189 0.276 *** -2.996 0.593 *** -3.254 0.782 *** 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 69,841 7,812 
Log Likelihood function -28,620.486 -2,473.993 
a These estimations also include the following variables: relation with reference person, and monthly dummies for the baseline 
hazard rates. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Table 6. Estimation results for transitions from U to permanent job, temporary job, self-
employment or OLF (U= unemployment, OLF= out of labour force). EPA linked files (1992-
2004). All sample. 
 ALL SAMPLE 
 U→permanent job U→temporary job U→ self-employment U→OLF 
 Param S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. Param. S.E. Sign. 
Gender (women) 0.074 0.129  -0.142 0.034 *** -0.534 0.180 *** -0.129 0.044 *** 
Age groups              
16-24 0.037 0.130  -0.060 0.033 * -0.281 0.172 * 0.395 0.052 *** 
25-34 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
35-49 -0.448 0.144 *** -0.267 0.037 *** -0.093 0.176  -0.101 0.056 * 
50-64 -0.577 0.209 *** -0.689 0.057 *** -0.968 0.292 *** 0.425 0.073 *** 
Marital status              
Married 0.122 0.190  0.129 0.051 *** 0.104 0.249  -0.414 0.088 *** 
Single, widow or 
divorced - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Women and married -0.180 0.281  -0.555 0.081 *** -0.587 0.488  0.939 0.111 *** 
Type of sector               
Public -0.444 0.176 *** 0.146 0.039 *** -0.408 0.255  0.079 0.061  
Private or else - -  - - - - - - - - - 
Cause of exit last job              
End of contract -0.357 0.152 ** 0.204 0.051 *** -1.013 0.178 *** -0.292 0.063 *** 
Layoff -0.178 0.206  -0.199 0.071 *** -1.154 0.280 *** -0.316 0.094 *** 
Other involuntary  -0.767 0.368 ** -0.062 0.097  0.299 0.245  -0.321 0.132 *** 
Voluntary - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Job category last job              
WCHS - - - - - - - - - - - - 
WCLS -0.070 0.196  0.052 0.056  -0.547 0.244 ** -0.071 0.081  
BCHS 0.430 0.219 ** 0.176 0.061 *** -0.312 0.254  0.057 0.093  
BCLS 0.279 0.201  0.147 0.058 *** -0.692 0.250 *** 0.087 0.083  
Industry              
Agriculture -0.550 0.234 ** 0.449 0.050 *** 0.271 0.236  0.495 0.079 *** 
Industry - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Building -0.308 0.175 * 0.189 0.045 *** 0.066 0.194  0.008 0.081  
Service 0.279 0.157 * 0.065 0.045  -0.134 0.218  0.155 0.071 ** 
GDP rate 0.037 0.041  0.029 0.011 *** 0.067 0.051  -0.079 0.015 *** 
Reg. Unemployment rate -0.015 0.008 * -0.012 0.002 *** 0.000 0.010  0.008 0.003 *** 
Benefits (yes) -0.104 0.114  -0.038 0.029  -0.521 0.148 *** -0.14 0.047 *** 
Previous experience(yes) 0.414 0.336  0.249 0.097 *** 1.221 0.405 *** 0.044 0.12  
Constant -5.915 0.675 *** -3.407 0.156 *** -5.306 0.740 *** -3.686 0.192 *** 
Observations (indiv.-spell) 111,155 
Likelihood function -46,913.391 
a These estimations also include all the variables included in Table 3. 
b ***  indicates significance at 1 percent; ** indicates significance at 5 percent; * indicates significance at 10 percent. 
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Figure 1. Inflow (%) into unemployment by origin (EPA linked files, 1992-2003). 
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Figure 2. Destinations of outflow (%) of the unemployed after six quarters (EPA linked 
files,1992-2003). 
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Figure 3. Destinations of outflow (%) of the unemployed after six quarters (EPA linked 
files ,1992-2003) for individuals without labour experience (WE) and job losers (JL). 
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Figure 4. Percentage of unemployed workers who find a job, by cause of exit from last 
job (EPA linked files, 1992-2003). 
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Figure 5. Percentage of unemployed workers who exit to out of the labour force, by 
cause of exit from last job (EPA linked files, 1992-2003). 
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 Figure 6. Percentage of unemployed workers who remain unemployed (censored 
observations), by cause of exit from last job (EPA linked files, 1992-2003). 
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Figure 7. Survival function of exiting from unemployment to a job (JOB) or out of 
labour force (OLF), for job losers and individuals without job experience (EPA linked 
files, 1992-2003). 
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Figure 8. Survival function of exiting from unemployment to a job, by cause of exit 
from last job (EPA linked files, 1992-2003). 
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Figure 9. Survival function of exiting from unemployment to out of labour force, by 
cause of exit in the last job (EPA linked files, 1992-2003). 
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Figure 10. Estimated hazard rate of exiting from U to JOB and OLF for job losers and 
the unemployed without previous labour experience (WLE). 
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